

**NOTICE.**—The new address of Central Labour College is 13, Penywern Road, Earl's Court, London, S.W.

For G. SIMS' address, see page 2 of Magazine cover.

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## EDITORIAL

**T**IME was when the class distinctions in society were openly displayed, when no attempt was made to conceal or to apologise for the gulf that separated "the rich man in his castle" from "the poor man at his gate." The ancient philosopher could calmly and candidly set it down, that some men are slaves by nature, and it is as much to their interests to be ruled as it is to their masters' interests to rule them. "The slave is a tool with life in it, and the tool is a lifeless slave."

**The  
Conjurors  
of  
Capitalism**

Aristotle lacked the bourgeois bump of hypocrisy. In the Middle Ages, the feudal lord was no timorous Hindu, hiding his treasure under the ground, but he aggressively and ostentatiously exhibited the sign and source of his power in the sight of all men. The class distinctions were proudly and openly affirmed in feudal society. But in capitalist society, and especially in the period of its downgoing, concealment of the class cleavage becomes the feverish aim of the capitalist spokesman. *The keener the antagonism, the wider the gulf, the more imperative grows the need to hide it. To distort the social facts, to conjure with social cards, is established as a function of education.* The Brotherhood of Capital and Labour, the Freedom of the Labourer, the Sacredness of Contracts, the Impartiality of Governments, the Wisdom of Conciliation, and the Higher Education of the Workpeople—all these are some of the most popular tricks in the repertoire of the capitalist conjuror. But there is another piece of legerdemain which has been performed very frequently of late, and with some degree of success. The trick is sometimes billed as "The Public" and on occasions as "The Community," and it is always staged when the audience show symptoms of restlessness and impatience with "the slow and painful process of evolution."

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL is in the first rank of the magicians. He who turned walking-sticks into serpents pales his ineffectual fires in comparison with the dexterous Home Secretary. We cannot do better than mark one of his performances. The scene is laid in the place where they "play the game," and over whose portals the business legend might appropriately be inscribed:—

**The  
"Public"  
Trick**

ALL KINDS OF TWISTING AND TURNING DONE HERE.

It is the night of Tuesday, the 22nd August, 1911. The hero of Houndsditch is on his feet breathing out fire and slaughter against the sinks of iniquity who dared to take the holy name of "law and order" in vain, against those so steeped in infamy as to accuse him and his beloved Government of taking sides with capital against labour. Then rolling up the sleeves of his innocence that his fraudulent hands might the more freely twist and turn, he took the ball of capital in his right hand (*Dieu et mon droit*) and the ball of labour in his left hand (the goats on the left), and held them up before the eyes of an admiring audience. With wistful countenance and injured innocence in his voice, the conjurer crooned plaintively—

"IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF TAKING SIDES WITH CAPITAL  
AGAINST LABOUR."

After none of these things did the Government seek! It was not for these that the dogs of war were unloosed, riot acts read, and heads broken. The hands of the conjuror move through the air, and hey-presto! there are three balls held up before the gaze of an enraptured and applauding audience. In the left hand there is still the ball of labour. But in the right hand there are two, the ball of capital and the new ball, which the conjuror hastens to christen, *the public*, while with all the cocksureness of the illusionist he triumphantly proclaims:—

"WE TOOK SIDES ONLY WITH THE PUBLIC."

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LET us dissect this wonderful piece of magic in the daylight of social reality. The occult Churchill has divided society into three categories, Capital, Labour, and the Public. What do they contain?

**The  
Trick  
Exposed**

In the category of capital we find those very concrete personalities that live by exploiting labour, whose revenue comes to them in the form of profit, and whose one desire is to increase that profit. This they can only do by increasing the rate of exploitation, by decreasing wages. In the category of labour are embraced all those very concrete personalities who can *only* live by selling their

labour-power, in return for which they receive wages. Wages are equal only to a part of the value produced by labour. They can only be increased by decreasing the rate of exploitation, by decreasing profits. The will to live drives the wage-labourers to resist decreases in their wages and to increase them. But now what of the third category, the public? What might be the cut of their jib? immediately we stick the pin in the ball, it vanishes into the thin air from whence it came. The fact is that *there is no concrete category called the public*. To divide society into three categories, Capital, Labour, and the Public, is as absurd as it would be to divide the human race into males, females and children. The public is simply an empty abstraction, staged by Fraud, and run in the interests of Fraud, *it is an attempt to conceal the antagonistic elements of capital and labour* under a generalization. "The suffering but disinterested Public"; "the vast neutral but affected Public"; "the serious inconvenience to the travelling Public"; "the alienation of Public opinion," and all such like hocus-pocus with which the Press has been running over with recently, is simply an illusion operated on behalf of very Private interests. *The Public is the hedge behind which Capital seeks shelter from the gathering storm.*



A STRIKE takes place among the miners. Out comes the Public, and in it are railwaymen, dockers, engineers, textile operatives, and all who do not work in the mines or are the proprietors of mines.

**How it Works in Practice** The miners are beaten back to work, and the Public are at rest. Then the engineers down tools. Instantly the Public are convoked, and therein are the formerly striking miners, railwaymen, dockers, textile operatives, and all who are neither engineering employees or employers. The Public power of scab protection is generously lent by a Public-loving Government, and is effective in teaching the engineers the sacredness of "the right to work." Once more Public opinion is satisfied. But now the dockers have been seduced by a few wicked agitators into withdrawing *their* labour, and out of the enchanted air come the Public again. In it are the miners and engineers formerly on strike, and the railwaymen, textile operatives, and all who neither work at the docks nor who are dock owners. Through the benevolence of the Right Hon. Judas Iscariot, M.P., an honourable compromise is effected, and after the dockers' fitful fever the Public sleep well again. Finally, the railwaymen break their sacred contracts. Hey-presto! into the Public are metamorphosed the miners, engineers, dockers, and all who are neither railway workers nor railway capitalists. Such is the process of transubstantiation, as performed by the high priests of the holy house of Capital. But to those that walk by sight and whose senses are not dulled by the incense of humbug there will be no illusion; it will be plainly seen *that the*

*so-called Public is in each case composed overwhelmingly of wage-labourers and in small degree of capitalists, that there are only the two classes in society, the employers and the employed, that every individual must be in one or the other of those economic categories. The Public is not a body separate and apart from Capital and Labour, but is made up of both the warring elements.*



EVERY battalion of each army is liable to be engaged, in turn, in open conflict. And it is therefore a matter of concern to the other branches of the army not engaged how the struggle will terminate.

**United  
Action**

There is no mistaking the attitude of the army of Capital when one of its battalions is in the firing line. Are the railway companies affected, then to their support rallies the mine owners, factory owners, engineering employers, and the rest of the host? *The employing class know that their interests lie in acting as a unit during a strike.* Not only does a stoppage of the wheels in one industry jeopardize the smooth working of the other industries, but a defeat for one branch of the army of Capital weakens the defence of the other branches. It is no different with Labour. The interests of each branch of wage-labour are identical. An injury to one is an injury to all. The defeat of the miners to-day means the defeat of the railwaymen to-morrow. It is the duty of each to support all by every means however uncomfortable and inconveniencing, and of all to support each. It is their duty, not from mere philanthropy or altruism, but for their very safety, to perform every possible service to their comrades under fire. If by "inconvenience to the public" is meant inconvenience to the miners, dockers, and all the other industrial workers owing to the railway workers being on strike, then it is beyond dispute that the way to shorten the inconvenience and suffering, and to end it altogether, is by those other branches of labour acting in support of the railwaymen. For certainly, it is not a convenience to the miners that they should continue to mine coal for transportation by blackleg railwaymen, any more than it would be a convenience to miners that railwaymen should transport coal mined by blackleg miners. *That is only a convenience for Capitalism. And that is why the myth of the Public is a convenience for Capitalists.*

W. W. C.

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**What's the matter with the C.L.C.?** Some of the London papers have even done it the honour of mentioning its removal to London—and this, after The Great Silence! There will be a house-warming about the middle of November, so those who wish to be present should write Mr. W. W. Craik, at Earl's Court. Next month some particulars of the new premises will appear in the Magazine.

## Ethics and Socialism

BY DR. ANTON PANNEKOEK

**K**ANT grew up in the school of rationalism and even took an active part in its advance. But it failed to satisfy him, he was continually racking his brains and seeking after what was truth. As is related in his biography, his attention was, in relatively advanced years, drawn to the study of Ethics through the work of the French author Rousseau. In this work it was pointed out how uncivilized, barbaric peoples, whose naive and pure hearts had not been corrupted by the evils of civilization, instantly discovered and knew what was morally good and what was evil. Kant was fully aware that his moral consciousness had remained quite untouched by the change in his theoretical conception of God and the Christian verities, and consequently that Rousseau was right in representing this moral consciousness as something directly natural or innate in Man. The foundations of Morality were not necessarily overthrown by his theoretical doubt in the correctness and proof of the Christian verities, these had obviously nothing to do with that learned trumpery, those proofs and arguments, and with philosophical hair-splitting. The moral consciousness was much more a sure and certain voice, which spoke to even the most uncultured of men and enabled them to distinguish the good from the evil.

That Kant was totally correct here can be easily confirmed by every man. Every one knows that our decision as to whether an action be good or evil is, as a rule, instantly arrived at, not after deep mental reflection, but rather springs directly from sentiment. It can perhaps be considered irrational when all the conditions are taken into consideration, but that does not prevent us from naming it a good and moral action. When, for example, we glorify the sacrifice of an individual for the sake of the people, or for his class, as a moral and heroic deed we do not ask, first of all, whether the sacrifice has ultimately benefited Society. This, as a rule, is not taken into consideration. But this decision comes to us clear and direct. And that it has not the remotest connexion with the holding of certain definite religious beliefs is proved by the fact that innumerable men subscribing to no definite religious views are possessed by precisely the same moral consciousness. Consequently, *Religion is not the basis of Ethics.*

Nevertheless, this was only a part of the revolution which Kant introduced into philosophy. His theoretical meditations led him to the conclusion that all those arguments, all those fine and well-thought-

out proofs were worthless when applied to *Metaphysics*. Science can only rest upon experience, and whatsoever is outside the realm of experience and reaches into the immeasurable can never come under the head of science. In the world of experience where, over all, causality and natural laws govern there is no room for God, Freedom and Immortality, and therefore it is quite impossible to come to any definite scientific conclusion concerning them. This gave the death-blow to the old theology—therein lay the revolutionizing importance of Kant's philosophy—but at the same time it provided the foundations for a new theology. This not only did away with the proof for the existence of God, but it also made it impossible to prove the non-existence of God and Immortality. Proof in this domain come to nothing both in their positive and negative sense. This left the road quite clear for Faith. In the Kantian philosophy expression was given to the victory of the rapidly advancing Natural Science over religion. Kant saw clearly that religion had nothing to expect in the world of experience, but in giving up the old position he greatly strengthened the even then impregnable position held by religion, viz., that of a personal belief. And his *Ethics* formed the corner-stone of this belief.

This mysterious inner voice which says to us : "Thou shalt !" proves to us that we belong to a higher world. Indeed, we belong also to nature and the subjection to causes which exists in the whole of nature, determines also our actions, but nevertheless we are not machines ; our moral consciousness teaches us that we have a free will to choose between good and evil. That freedom which is not to be found in nature can only have a meaning when we assume that it has no connexion with the usual material life of this earth, and that there exists above a moral world order. That higher world to which we also belong, is the world of God, of angels, and of the immortal soul. In this manner must everyone, who is conscious of this moral freedom of necessity, arrive to a belief in religious truths ; not in the sense of an objective demonstrable truth, but merely in the sense of a pure, personal experience.

Thus was the earlier relation of *Ethics* and Religion fully reversed. Religion is no longer the basis of *Ethics*, but *Ethics* is now the basis of Religion. Because of the great importance this gave to *Ethics* it became necessary for philosophy to investigate far more closely into the nature of moral phenomena. Surely there must be rules whereby one can recognize whether certain actions are moral or immoral, and by which one's perception is unconsciously guided. For every action which answers to the direct sentiment is not necessarily moral. It could happen, for example, that one might out of indignation for some or any abominable deed instantly incapacitate the doer from further evil. Such an action would not necessarily be moral. Kant now sets up the rule which is to serve as the measure of moral consciousness : Act in such a manner that the rules which you

observe can be at the same time the general rule for all. As soon as one sees that Society could not exist if every judge and hangman played to suit his own hand alone, so can one also understand why such action must be immoral.

This conception presupposes that men are beings having equal rights, who, as moral beings, stand above the rest of the world, with higher aims, and on that account dare not become misused as simple expedient for other aims. Man possesses in the moral law a curb-chain to his actions, it can often bring him into conflict with his direct interests, and his striving after the greatest possible happiness, and therefore his will is not governed by this moral law alone; he is indeed a sinful creature. In spite of this, this law alone is to determine what is duty, morality has nothing to do with his happiness. Man shall be moral, that is, he shall follow the commands of morality according to his higher destiny, inconsequent as to whether it brings him happiness or unhappiness.

The Neo-Kantians assert that these Ethics of Kant are applicable to all ages, are eternal, and above all, that where there are rational beings they must apply. Kant himself, also believed he had for ever fixed Ethics without any qualifications; but we can now distinctly see the particular hypothesis which to him remained veiled, because he of necessity considered it to be the natural order of things. First he postulates a society of men—loses thus all and every sense for a solitary man who has no concern with other men. Thus society must consist of men having equal rights and uninterrupted maintenance must be recognized by each as a more important affair and a greater power than the solitary individual. In the opposition between virtue and happiness, which governs the Kantian Ethics, is included at the same time the thought that submission to duty, the moral action, does not as a rule bring happiness to man. The particular order of society which is postulated in this ethics is one which brings to man often unhappiness instead of happiness, but he shall not complain, and shall place the maintenance of this order above his own personal happiness.

It is not difficult to discover what particular form of Society has served here as master and hypothesis. It is the bourgeois order of Society, the yet undeveloped prevailing small bourgeois form of capitalist society, which for Kant and his contemporaries formed the only natural and rational, and therefore, as a matter of course, *the* form of Society. As this form of Society gradually developed and the bourgeois class raised itself to the ruling class, no one dreamed that out of it a Society would develop with such sharply-defined class-antagonisms as we recognize to-day. No! one believed that with the shattering of the feudal chains, when first universal freedom and legal equality were introduced, the world would soon attain the happy condition of brotherhood. Freedom, equality and fraternity was the

battle-cry of the French Revolution, and this offers to us a parallel for the Ethics of Kant, where also freedom and equality form the main thoughts. There, as here, it was the self-same idea-world, the world philosophy of the advancing Bourgeoisie, which there in a practical political, here in a theoretical-philosophical form appeared. But if one at that time had no idea of the modern powerful class-antagonisms one knew, nevertheless, that in the competitive struggle not every one found his advantage, many went under and sank down into the ranks of the proletariat. Especially for them had the Ethics of Kant an application: they should bear their lot meekly, work industriously, and do their duty. The well-being of the society (i.e., the whole of the bourgeois class) stood above the well-being of the individual.

These deductions show how closely the philosophy of Kant was bound up with the great social revolution of that time, and how fully it merits the name of a bourgeois philosophy. In it is embodied the quintessence of bourgeois thought. Now in our time confused minds would give to the ethics of Kant a general applicability and would particularly utilize this ethics as a basis for Socialism; they are obviously led astray thereto, because the fundamental thought of this ethics—freedom and equality of all men—is a demand of modern Socialism: but this can only become practicable in a socialist society, then only will a time come when man no longer becomes merely a means for the producing of surplus value, but becomes regarded as an ultimate end. He who has recognized that the Kantian Freedom and Equality is only an expression for the youthful illusions of the bourgeois class, will quickly recognize that such a foundation for Socialism would be as strictly logical as if one would found Socialism on the watch words of the French Revolution: Freedom, Equality and Fraternity. Apart from the "catch-words," the Ethics of Kant would also badly satisfy a Socialist society; to be sure, even there the community would stand above the individual, but there an opposition of interests, such as exists under Capitalism would be inconceivable, and as this form of society will always bring happiness, not unhappiness, the opposition between happiness and virtue cannot there exist.

What is true in the report of the eternity of the Ethics of Kant is the undisputable fact that Kant has contributed valuably to the insight into the nature and the characteristics of morality, knowledge that has in this manner been won for science is never lost. But in this sense it is a most incomplete science of Ethics which Kant has produced, and the new insight which Marxism imparted was necessary before this science could be further developed.

*To be continued.*

Translated for the "*Plebs*" Magazine by NUN NICHOLAS.



## By the Way

The result of the appeal for funds has **not** been very hopeful to date. **Is the Magazine to continue?** That is the question which our readers have to decide during the next month, and it will be decided by **cash**, not **sympathy**. So hurry up!

The audit has been completed. Mr. Tom Rees having signed the accounts as presented last month, and pronounced—"All correct." The name of Mr. H. Beaumont should have appeared last month among those who had redeemed August Meet I.O.U.'s.

At the 27th Annual Convention of the Trades and Labour Congress held at Calgary, Canada, recently, a resolution was adopted recommending the establishment of a Labour College to be owned and controlled by the Trade Unions of the Dominion.—*Labour Leader*, 13th Oct., 1911.

The tragic death of Helene von Doenniges, who committed suicide at Munich recently, has an almost personal interest for those of us who have been privileged to hear the lecture on "Lassalle," by Dennis Hird. It is, perhaps, not too much to claim that this lecture is quite the best of a very lengthy list given from time to time by Dennis; it certainly has been the favourite of past generations of students at Ruskin College and the C.L.C. What memories it conjures up of happy evenings past, when, under the spell of Dennis's oratory and congenial company, we breathlessly followed the crowded Hour of Life of the great German Labour leader and his Helene! How we deplored Lassalle's mistake in losing grip of the happy circumstance—the train across the border—that would have enabled him (in modern fashion as befitted his rôle) to emulate Lochinvar! Instead Lassalle died—and Helene lived (?) Now we are tempted to say: Happy Lassalle! To die loving and beloved; to depart hence before the prosaic facts of life shattered and scattered your hopes and dreams; before the combined problems of Labour and Home brought disillusionment. The happy dead! And yet, 'tis sweet while it lasts, we hope to dream the dream again with Dennis at the Earl's Court Mansion of the Blest at no distant date.

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## The Proletarian Theory of Understanding

### IV

**R**EPETITION is the mother of study.

*The Problem.* What is the nature of understanding or thought in general? What is the general nature of the thought process?

1. The faculty of thought requires besides a brain, material for its activity. It is neither sufficient "in itself" nor is its connexion one-sided. Our logic teaches us that the intellect is universally connected, that it is what it is, only by grace of this universal interrelation.

2. The material required for the force of thinking is supplied by the senses. We may call this material sense perceptions.

3. The intellect or faculty of thought in touch with sense-perceptions produces mental pictures which we call ideas or concepts.

4. We make a distinction between the mental picture and the object pictured, a distinction between thinking and being. They are to be distinguished, however, only relatively. *All differences are equally relative.* Thinking and being, the abstract and the concrete, the image and the imaged, are not two different existences, but two species or forms of one and the same existence.

5. *Everything may be understood.* But as the objects of understanding are not dissolved in the understanding, as they retain their independent existence outside of our brain to be understood by others, to be seen, or felt, or heard, or tasted, we must recognize that everything may be understood only relatively. *Understanding is not everything.* Being only one member of the cosmic organism it is limited by the other members. It cannot get out of its own skin. It cannot sing, or play, or dance, or replace any of the other members or forces. But in so far as everything may be understood, in so far as everything knowable is open to human cognition, it is unlimited. *In the province of cognition the intellect is unlimited. In the chain of universal existence it is limited.*

6. We became aware of everything in a two-fold way: (1) outside, in the concrete, (2) inside, in the abstract. *We become aware of understanding therefore, in this two-fold way.* Just as we take a mental picture of a tree, so we take a mental picture of the force or faculty that takes pictures—of understanding.

But here we must make another distinction. We must distinguish between *instinctive awareness* and *scientific awareness*, between the instinctively produced picture and the consciously analysed picture. The term "think" is very loosely used. We very often complain that the working class do not think. But all men think. They must think. The real trouble is that men do not think *scientifically, analytically.* Our force of thought coming in contact with sense-perceptions, cannot avoid producing ideas or concepts. The worker cannot avoid having a mental picture, for example, of wages. What he fails to do is to analyse that picture or concept, compare it with the concrete, test the likeness of the photograph with the thing photographed. To analyse the concept of wages is to determine what are wages in general, what is the general nature of wages. In so doing, we separate the essential elements of this experience, the general

attribute of wages, from the unessential elements. The essential is the true nature, the general nature. In actual experience, wages may be paid daily or weekly, they may be thirty shillings or twenty shillings, they may be paid by railway companies or colliery companies. But the scientific analysis of the concept of wages leads us to the understanding that the general nature of wages consists in their being the price of labour-power. The instinctive idea, and with that the object of which the idea is a picture is now theoretically understood. *Every idea corresponds to some real object, and to analyse the idea is to analyse the object.* They only appear to be different because of our faculty of separating phenomena into two parts, the concrete and the abstract, the practice and the theory, the pictured and the picture. The concrete is the premise of the abstract, the practice the premise of theory. To theorize is to systematize, is to give orderly arrangement to the phenomena of experience, is to enable us to consciously dominate the things of the world, but this power of systematization is always and everywhere based on experience. *The wider the circle of experience the greater the power.* The closer we stick to experience the clearer our understanding, the less we stick to experience the more confused are our ideas. The limited experience of children and their untrained force of reasoning, make them easily susceptible to the assimilation of the fantastic and the false, to Jack the Giant-killer and Santa Claus. And just so is it to the race in its childhood. The woods have lost their dryads, the mountains their creeds, and the gods have flown from high Olympus, with the widening of the circle of experience and with the possibilities of clearer reasoning that follow out of it. If there is still a chamber left in the house of reason where fantasy resides, and where the metaphysical darkness shrouds something higher, it is because the chamber has not yet been swept by the broom of sober science and illumined by the light of democratic logic. And while the general diffusion of this light waits upon the general democratic experience, those who look for the dawn may discern in it prophetically, the splendours of full noon.

*To think consciously, scientifically, we must scientifically understand the nature of thinking.* To take good photographs we must understand the nature of the photographic process. And we proceed to take such a photograph in the same way as we should proceed to take a mental photograph of a tree or anything else.

Just as it is a fact of experience that men are paid wages, so is it a fact of experience that men think. *It is a sense-perceived fact.* That being given, there is at once produced the instinctive idea or concept. The thought process exists simultaneously (1) as an object, (2) as a concept, just as in the case of wages. We have now to raise this instinctive idea to the position of a theoretically understood idea, a consciously analysed idea. What is the general nature of the thought process? We perceive a number of concrete thought-processes. There is the economic thinker, the biologist, the chemist, the

physicist, the psychologist, the moralist, and so on. Their subjects are varied, their methods of research various, their data various. But what are they all doing in common? What have their thought-processes in general? Look at them and see what their thinking has in common. Then look at your own thought-process which has their thought-processes for concrete objects. You will find that your method of investigating their understanding is the same as the general nature of their method of understanding the various phenomena in the various fields of research. They are all in common deriving the general out of the concrete. And that is precisely the method by which you seek to understand the understanding. The *general* is the nature of your concept and all their concepts, *it is the nature of all concepts.*

" IF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GENERAL OUT OF THE CONCRETE  
CONSTITUTES THE GENERAL METHOD BY WHICH REASON  
ARRIVES AT UNDERSTANDING, THEN WE HAVE FULLY  
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GENERAL OUT OF THE CONCRETE."

Thus from the *effects* of reason or understanding we have derived the concept of reason. *We derive the concept of thought from the experience of thought.* It is necessary that we should emphasize this fact very strongly in view of the spectacle presented in the circus of metaphysics by those who with feet in the air and head on the ground derive the experience of thought from the concept of thought, the concrete from the abstract.

WILL W. CRAIK.

**NOTE.**—Owing to the limitations of space we are unable to elaborate this intricate and important subject in as detailed a way as we would desire. We shall be glad to hear from anyone interested in this investigation of any difficulties that may be encountered in following our rather generalized outline.

## Political and Industrial Action

**T**HERE can be no doubt that at present there is a wave of discontent with political action sweeping over the world of labour. One cannot come in contact with the forward section of Trade Unionists without hearing, at least from many, declarations that Parliament is played out, the Labour Party dead and damned, and the methods of revolution for the future restricted to the general strike—with possibly a dash of the "citizen army" and the barricades thrown in. In this article, I propose to inquire how far a Socialist, who is neither a Radical on the one hand nor an impossibilist on the other, can go with the school of "direct action."

It is generally considered that the advocate of direct action is altogether a more advanced and revolutionary type of person than the Parliamentarian. As far as the most prominent exponents, at present, of the new school are concerned, this may be in a general way true. But we must not forget that the oldest, as well as the

newest, unionism was anti-Parliamentary. The cry of "no politics in the unions" is one which is raised alike by such men as Mr. W. V. Osborne and Mr. Morris, of the London Bricklayers. And while, no doubt, a great number of those who at present decry Parliamentary action, do so because they find the Labour Party too slow, there are as undoubtedly others who do so because they are Liberals or Tories at heart, and object to being committed to political aims which, rightly or wrongly, they consider mischievous and subversive. We should beware, then, lest when we think we are fostering a new spirit of revolutionary syndicalism, we may be really propping up and encouraging mere reaction.

The case against Parliamentary methods, as put by their opponents of the syndicalist school, is roughly this. "Six years ago we were told that the strike was an obsolete weapon, that the workers were to capture the political machine, and society was to be revolutionized by the ballot-box. Political action has been tried during these six years. As a result, practically all the working-class representatives have become hangers-on of the Liberal Caucus, have defended the most reactionary proposals of the Government, have failed to voice in an adequate way the working-class point of view, and are afraid for their lives to oppose the Government when there is any chance of that step precipitating an election. They have also completely lost touch with the rank and file, and are no longer even capable of acting as reliable spokesmen of the workers in trade disputes. Meanwhile, the cost of living has gone up, and the people are worse off materially than when this political craze was started. The so-called reforms which have been passed with the help of the Labour Party have been measures calculated to stereotype the division of classes, or to render the poor contented by means of sops flung to them from the table of the rich, but not to transfer the means of production to any extent into the hands of the workers. "Therefore," conclude the anti-Parliamentarians, "let us turn our backs on Parliament, let the Labour Party go to perdition its own way, and we will build up an industrial organization that shall eventually bring down the edifice of capitalist civilization about the ears of its upholders."

Now, in the first place, I think the failure of the Labour Party, though palpable in too many respects, can still be exaggerated. I think that the disappearance of Labour members from the House of Commons would be a source of real satisfaction to those who are running our civilization for us at present. How otherwise can you explain the Osborne judgment? Even if it be in small things, the fact remains that the Labour Party is in some ways a nuisance to the powers that be. Sir Charles Owens, the general manager of the South-Western Railway, giving evidence before the Railway Commission, stated that the policy of the Labour Party in blocking railway bills would seriously hamper the railway companies. It is also a fact that the governing bureaucracy have been distinctly

exercised in their minds by the persistent way in which some Labour Members of Parliament have called attention to violations of the Fair Wages Clause. I respectfully question whether it is good policy to break a weapon which causes, even when most inefficient, a good deal of annoyance to the enemy.

I have, however, no particular desire to hold a brief for the present Labour Members of Parliament. I admit that, on the whole, they must be pronounced a disappointment. Nevertheless, I question whether the failure is due to causes inherent in Parliamentary action as such. The working-class parties of other countries have not proved failures. The Socialist parties of France, Germany, Austria, and Belgium command a wholesome respect in the bourgeoisie of those nations. Even in England, there are Labour Members—unfortunately, a minority—whose records show disinterested and unflagging devotion to their class, and who are cordially detested in consequence by the master class.

The truth surely is that much of the regrettable weakness of the Parliamentary Party is due to the imperfect permeation of the rank and file with the principles of independence. Here many are, I submit, at once unduly pessimistic as regards political, and unduly optimistic as regards industrial, action. We hear of the great revolutionary spirit evinced by the present unrest; but is it not as well that we should pause to ask how many of those who come out on strike are really actuated by a desire for more than a little higher wages and a little shorter hours? Indeed, is it fair to expect otherwise?

Where the case for purely industrial action seems to break down is in the attempt to forecast even a remotely probable accomplishment of the social revolution on those lines. The idea would appear to be that the workers are to be more and more perfectly organized, until one day the united proletariat will combine to lock the exploiters out, assume possession of the means of production, and organise the new society. One's only comment is, "Can you imagine it being done by the people you see around you?" The programme seems to ignore the fact of the whole legal, police and military machinery being left in the hands of the governing class; of the appallingly large slum areas continuing to afford an endless recruiting ground for blacklegs; of the unlikelihood of securing the rigid solidarity, even in the ranks of regular workers, necessary to render such a move possible; and finally, of the impotence of industrial methods in the spheres of social advance not directly associated with hours, wages and conditions of labour. It is difficult, for example, to see how industrial action would bring about the much-desired increase in the means of working-class education, the communal maintenance of school children, the public provision of good housing accommodation, or the absolutely necessary measures to cope with unemployment.

Of course, our syndicalist friends may ridicule one and all of these as so much "charity-mongering" and "tinkering," in which case I leave them to solve the problem how to make a revolution on an empty stomach.

To attain anything like a satisfactory *temporary* solution of the foregoing questions, it seems to me that working-class political action (not exclusive of, but supplementary to, industrial action) is essential. Otherwise, the capitalists and their governing hacks will have a free hand in regard to them, and will, be sure, take steps to meet such problems on *their* lines, not on ours. (The Minority Report, the proposal for compulsory continuation schools, and the suggestions in the W.E.A. memorial on university education, which readers of the "PLEBS" may remember, all indicate what those lines might be.) Working-class political action is, therefore, required; and in order that it may not be a fiasco, the most unceasing propaganda among the rank and file of workers is necessary. That propaganda must be revolutionary, and based on the class-struggle; but for all that we must not be afraid to be constructive.

The capabilities of industrial action, it seems to me, are purely destructive. Properly planned strikes can, of course, win appreciable increases in wages and reductions in hours; but it is admitted by all who consider the matter that, in the long run, the master class get their own back by "speeding up" and by increasing the cost of living. The ultimate value of strikes, therefore, must be in rendering the capitalist system insecure and difficult to work, and in eventually compelling the nationalization of one industry after another. But, while I am open to conviction at the hands of those who speak with more experience than I have of these questions, I cannot but think that for the actual revolution which we desire, i.e., the abolition of class-rule and the absorption of rent, interest, and profit in the reward of toil, it is to political action that we must ultimately look.

A. H. M. ROBERTSON.

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## The Philosophy of Joseph Dietzgen

THE character I have chosen to present is perhaps little known, partly because he was not a professional philosopher, and partly because his works have only for a few years been obtainable in the English language. Yet, as his work carries with it a system of knowledge on which rests not only a particular and definite world-conception, but a consistent scheme of thought for the unification of practice, I launch forward without any apology. The philosophy of Dietzgen is new in so far that it cannot be connected to any of the other well-known schools of thought, viz. :—Idealism, Materialism, or Agnosticism. It represents rather a critical recon-

ciliation of rival philosophies woven into a definite plan. It does not pretend to give absolute truth. "Philosophy," says Dietzgen, "is that endeavour which seeks to throw light on the process of human thought." When Dietzgen entered the arena of investigation, Karl Marx had developed beyond the school of Hegel: the school which started with the abstract idea of being or existence in general, and claimed that this concept in its emptiness was identical with no existence. In other words, mind created objects. As a social philosopher, Marx reversed the order. He started from facts and rose to abstract ideas. But his theory was limited to practical social applications. It takes its departure from human society. It is a study of the social elements affecting the personality. It does not inquire into the existence of being, it takes being in existence. Thus, as it does not give a clue to the solution of the problem of cognition—the nature of the human faculty of thought—it lacks the basis of a positive philosophy.\* To complete the theory, to reveal not only the dependence of mind on social conditions, but its interrelation with nature and the universe was the particular achievement of my subject.

To bring the reader into closer grip with his system, I prefer to let Dietzgen speak himself in a few extracts I have chosen from his *Positive Outcome of Philosophy*. There he demonstrates, "The world itself is nothing but the sum total of its phenomena. Although we distinguish between the faculty of thought and its phenomena or manifestations, yet the faculty of thought itself exists in reality only in the sum total of its manifestations" (pp. 75-6). "Consciousness is a form, or a quality of existence which differs from other forms of being in that it is aware of its existence" (78-9). "It is true of spiritual things as well as of physical things. . . . that they are what they are, not in themselves, not in their abstract nature, but in contact with other things in reality" (p. 86). "Hence things must be conceived locally, *first* as being in touch with one another and existing side by side, through their universal interrelation; and *secondly* as following in succession one out of another. They are mutually causes and effects, simultaneously in space and successively in time. They are inseparable whether seen in the past, the present, or the future. Anything that is torn out of its relations with the world ceases to exist. *A thing is anything in itself only because it is something for other things, by acting or appearing in connexion with something else.* . . . Every part is a separate part and connected inseparably with the whole" (p. 202). "Thus the forms of things change according to their connexions, and they are what they are only as parts of the universal interrelation. The human mind lives and works only in connexion with the rest of the material universe—the organic unity of all things" (p. 194). "Special truths enlighten the intellect. But the understanding that all specialities are connected

\* A statement on this point will appear in the December No. of Magazine.—Ed.



with one another by unity, which is truth itself, gives us a certain general enlightenment which certainly does not render any special research unnecessary, or take the place of it, but which may well serve as the foundation of all research . . . a fundamental assistance" (p. 207). "The positive outcome of philosophy is the knowledge of the monistic (unitary) way in which the universe is active in the human understanding" (p. 357).

Here I have attempted—allowing for the space at my disposal—to extract an epitome of Dietzgen's philosophy, perhaps it is not the best obtainable, yet I hope it will serve to illustrate our purpose in attempting its practical consequences. Let me briefly review the main points in the extract. The philosophy as here outlined rejects all kinds of postulates and starts from the positive data of experience. The data of experience are the several states of our consciousness. Consciousness is the knowledge of being in existence. We become acquainted with reality—the effectiveness of things in their relation—through the various objects of the surrounding world making their various impressions upon the different senses. Thus all the objects of our surroundings are mirrored in their relation toward us and among themselves. From the concepts of things abstractions are made, and by the help of our abstract thoughts we can recognize the relations that interconnect the phenomena of nature; we can trace the laws which denote the changes of their forms. Thus facts are pictured in sensation by their form. These pictures are grouped under the term of cognition. Matter and Energy being eternal and indestructible, form constitutes the order of the world. It affords a direction to the movements of the forces of nature. Thus sensory experience and formal cognition are inseparable. So much then for the way in which we all attain knowledge. How is knowledge rendered definite? Form and interrelation are objective qualities. The relations that interconnect the phenomena of Nature, and the laws which sum up the changes of their forms are not material things; they are not concrete objects, yet they are realities. They are facts in existence. This applies to the relations of persons as well as things. Socialism can be a reality in life, but it cannot be a materiality. It is not "a thing in itself," but a quality of existence. The same applies to the terms soul, spirit, &c. Once grasp this central principle of denoting reality from materiality and you can lay bare the hollowness of the materialist who tries to explain all phenomena from the material element of the object. You can also square your account with the Spiritualist, or Idealist, who limits himself to the subjective element alone, as if man's measure of the universe was the universe. Both views are deficient in their explanation of the elementary data of mind life. You will also be in a position to meet the Agnostic who relegates the real problems of existence to the great unknowable, which he demonstrates to know lies beyond human experience. The philosophy of agnosticism is wrong. The unknown is by no means

unknowable. All phenomena are intelligible. The existence of a thing implies the manifestation of its existence. Absolute existence which is not manifested in some way is equal to non-existence. Dietzgen in his reconciliation of these rival philosophies, bridges the chasm between the subjective and the objective with the oneness of all existence. Our conception of the world in order to be true must be based on the facts of sensation. Not on the subjective aspect of sensation only, but also and especially on its objective aspects of motions of a special form. In this way only can we acquire a conception of the objects as they must be independent of the subject. The objective qualities of form and interrelation are imported into the mind by experience, and distinguished from the purely sensory elements by abstraction. *Knowledge is an appropriate representation of facts in mental symbols.* Symbols acting as a representation of the essential features in the phenomena of Nature. If ideas have not originated from the data of experience, if there is no reality corresponding to them, they exist only as illusions. The true data of experience are facts that, under the same conditions, can be ascertained by every thinking person and verified by experiment. Thus Dietzgen's philosophy is based on the principle of consistency. Four is the product of twice two. It admits of no revelation, no intuition, no mysticism. It deals with facts and facts only.

Having thus briefly reviewed the position as propounded by Dietzgen, we may now pass to the adaptation of his principles in their application to fundamental problems. For this purpose I have chosen only the champions in their respective spheres of knowledge. Leaving you to apply the same principle in the general rôle of literature. I have in mind Omar Khayyam's "Magic Shadow Show," Henrich Heine's "Riddle of Life," Tennyson's "Behind the Veil," Emerson's "Ploughman, plow and furrow are of one stuff."

My first analysis shall be the position held by Prof. E. Haeckel as revealed in the conclusion to his *Riddle of the Universe*. Haeckel says, "Only one comprehensive riddle of the universe now remains. The problem of substance. What is the character of this mighty world-wonder that the realistic scientist calls nature or the universe, the idealist philosopher calls substance or the cosmos, the pious believer calls Creator or God? Can we affirm to-day that the marvellous progress of cosmology has solved this problem of substance, or at least that it has brought us nearer the solution? We grant at once that the innermost character of nature is just as little understood by us as it was by Anaximander and Empedocles 2,400 years ago, by Spinoza and Newton 200 years ago, and by Kant and Goethe 100 years ago. We must even grant that this *essence of substance* becomes more mysterious and enigmatic the deeper we penetrate into the knowledge of its attributes, matter and energy, and the more thoroughly we study its countless phenomenal

forms and their evolution. We do not know *the thing in itself* that lies behind these knowable phenomena" (p. 134). [The italics are mine.] Before passing a criticism on this position, in justice to Haeckel, let me say he understood the possibilities, and also the dangers of his opponents hiding much under his own doctrine, for while still writing on the great enigma, he concludes, "But why trouble about this enigmatic 'thing in itself,' when we have no means of investigating it, when we do not clearly know whether it exists or not?" One thing is certain, Haeckel had not solved the "comprehensive riddle" he propounded. His epistle leaves the problem both dualistic and mystical. To put his position in a nut-shell, it is: all different phenomena are but aspects of one single reality, called fundamental substance. This fundamental substance has two forms of existence. Its knowable form and its unknowable form. Now unless we can get rid, logically, of dualism, there is still left a back ground for Divine fiat, and the exponents of intellectual orthodoxy. Let us then see if Dietzgen's Monism—the unitary conception of existence—can abolish the dark roads of mysticism.

Northumberland.

*(To be continued.)*

EBBY EDWARDS.

## Grip Tight!

**E**ARL ROY lay dying one summer eve,  
 He lay at his casement wide;  
 He looked at the green and fertile lands,  
 And said with a flash of pride:  
 "Son Robert, this lordship fain is yours;  
 If any dispute thy right,  
 I have but two words to say to thee,  
 Grip Tight!"

Two short strong words like a trumpet call,  
 Now listen to what they say:  
 There is a tide in the affairs of men  
 And it comes not every day.  
 If it bring thee good in some good hour,  
 Take it, it is thy right;  
 Wouldst thou keep it thine? there is one way—  
 Grip Tight!

And if thou hast found thy work to do,  
 Then this is thy wisest part;  
 Count it as one of the best of gifts,  
 And do it with hand and heart,  
 If slack or careless, others will seize  
 A blessing thou held'st too light,  
 The skirt of a happy circumstance  
 Grip Tight!

Then here's to the man who can work and keep  
 To the task that he has planned :  
 Here's to the true and steadfast heart,  
 To the sure and strong right hand ;  
 To him who knows and can hold his place,  
 Who knows and can hold his right,  
 Who says to his heart in the tug of life,  
 The two short words of the brave old knight :  
 Grip Tight !

## At Newcastle

**A**RRIVING at Newcastle, I made a bee-line for Mr. Bowerman, or, as he is often called, "Gentleman Bowerman." I found him coming out of church. "Gentleman Bowerman" certainly deserves his sobriquet—as far as external appearances go. Black broadcloth, three-quarter tail coat, semi-top-hat to match, with an air of refinement, silky voice, and deprecatory manner. My business with him was to inquire as to the accuracy of the Press reports which stated that the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress had established a series of scholarships at Ruskin College. I explained that I represented the Central Labour College, and was, therefore, a man of peace. If he could say the Press reports were inaccurate, we should simply confine ourselves to securing a public repudiation. Otherwise we should reluctantly be compelled to make a disturbance. How much nicer to amicably settle matters by peaceful discussion, &c. Mr. Bowerman immediately became a Trade Union official. He deprecated "outside" discussion ; would make a statement on the Parliamentary report before the Congress. Asked if he did not think, seeing that he was on the Ruskin College Committee, that his attitude would place our side at a disadvantage for purposes of discussion, he repeated that anything he would have to say on the matter would be stated officially to the Congress. Nothing more to be got from that quarter, I left him with the statement that we had done our best to avoid controversy.

Inquiries from other quarters elicited vague warnings that we were on the wrong track ; that to raise the matter would be a "storm in a tea-cup," &c.

However, early Monday morning found Davison and myself at the printer's in full war paint. At the Conference doors Ben

McKay appeared for the purpose of lending a hand. Welcome reinforcement. When the delegates returned from dinner, the first paper to attract their notice on the tables was the following :—

A QUESTION  
TO THE  
PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE.

During the first week in August there appeared throughout the Press of this country an announcement that the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress and the Executive Committee of the Federation of Trades had established a scheme of scholarships at Ruskin College, Oxford, and students were to be sent in September. The announcement had such an official appearance, that the Annual Conference of the Central Labour College, representing nearly 200,000 workers, passed a resolution of indignant protest against the bureaucracy of the above-mentioned Executives. This was sent to the Press, but it received no reply from either body. At a meeting of the South Wales Miners' Executive held last week, a similar resolution was unanimously carried. These were its terms :—

"That this Committee strongly protests against the bureaucratic action of the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress in establishing scholarships at Ruskin College without the consent of its constituent bodies. That we further declare this action to be exceptionally objectionable in view of the keen controversy now going on between Ruskin College and the Central Labour College throughout the constituent bodies."

In short, the Press reports have raised considerable indignation among the trade unionists who support the Central Labour College, because of its policy of independence in working-class education, and condemn Ruskin College for its policy of co-partnership with the W.E.A. and Oxford University. When we say that the majority of the trade unions that formerly supported Ruskin College after a keen controversy now support the Central Labour College, the feelings of indignation will surely be appreciated

Inquiries have been made from the Central Labour College to Mr. Bowerman and other members of the Parliamentary Committee, but they refused either to deny or confirm the accuracy of the Press reports. We respectfully submit that if the Press reports be correct, then the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress are guilty of an unwarrantable piece of sheer bureaucracy, while if the Press reports are incorrect, then, *after all the stir and protest they have caused*, the Parliamentary Committee are guilty of grave neglect in allowing a statement so prejudicial to the welfare of a working-class educational institution to remain all that time unrepudiated. When it is remembered that some of the warmest

partisans of Ruskin College are members and officials (at least *pro. tem.*) of the Parliamentary Committee, this latter neglect will reflect all the more seriously upon their conduct.

We appeal to all lovers of democracy, whether they support Ruskin or the Central Labour College, to see to it that on this question the Parliamentary Committee be subordinate to the wishes of the rank and file. After all committees should be the servants and not the masters of the people they represent.

Issued on behalf of the

PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE,

CENTRAL LABOUR COLLEGE,

OXFORD.

That was the first shot. However, the Parliamentary Report was not taken until Tuesday, and though the men were ready awaiting Mr. Bowerman's pronouncement, not a word was forthcoming from that gentleman. Arising out of the report, there was tremendous excitement in the Conference on the question of the "fraternal" delegates, Mr. Shackleton (of Ruskin College Committee fame), and Messrs. Mitchell and Cummings; also the question of the use of the military during the strikes, and it was, therefore, quite impossible to raise our question. The next step was to raise it on the Education debate. Mr. Morris, of the Bricklayers', did this, but was ruled out of order. Then Ruskin College came to our rescue. They issued the following leaflet in reply to ours:—

TRADE UNIONISTS!

AN ATTACK

IS BEING MADE UPON THE

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE.

On October 30th, 1909, a Conference of Delegates, representing all working-class organisations which had contributed to the support of Ruskin College, was held in Oxford. This Conference approved unanimously a constitution for the government of the College, asking the PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE OF THE TRADE UNION CONGRESS and the MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS each to appoint two of their number who would sit upon the Governing Council of the College, these delegates to represent the smaller contributing trade unions which cannot individually maintain students in residence. The two appointed by the PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE are MR. C. W. BOWERMAN, M.P., and MR. JAMES SEXTON, J.P. Because of this appointment the Parliamentary Committee are being harassed unjustly.

The money subscribed by the trade unions above-mentioned is devoted to providing NATIONAL TRADE UNION SCHOLARSHIPS, for which members of contributing societies are eligible to become candidates. These scholarships are under the supervision of the Parliamentary Committee and of the Management Committee of the General Federation. You are asked to ignore misrepresentation of these facts, and to uphold the Parliamentary Committee in voicing the wishes of the smaller unions who desire to educate their members.

HENRY ALLSOPP,

*Secretary, Ruskin College.*

Here, then, was the information we had been seeking. According to this precious document, the Trade Union Congress is shown to be the handmaid of Ruskin College Conference. They had asked the Parliamentary Committee, and apparently this important body theoretically representing the Trade Union Movement of Great Britain had, *on their own initiative*, placed the weight of their influence, to the prejudice of the C.L.C. (who are supported by a larger number of Trade Unions), on the side of Ruskin College. "Oh, the never ending audacity of elected persons"! Our attempt to claim the elementary right of consent of the rank and file before a controversial question should be so arbitrarily decided by a mere committee, is *Bathetically* described as coercion of the smaller unions. With the facts before us, we at once arranged for a deputation to see the Standing Orders Committee. Messrs. Barker and Winstone (two stalwart supporters of ours) acted on this deputation. They placed the two leaflets before the Standing Orders Committee, and requested a discussion in the Conference to remove the anomaly. The Standing Orders Committee were sympathetic. They held that such a question *ought not to have been determined without the consent of the Conference*. But—the question could only be raised by an organization. It was pointed out that the S.W. Miners had sent in a strongly worded resolution based on the Press reports. Strangely enough, however, the resolution did not appear in the correspondence nor in any document of the Congress. What has become of it? Nothing remained but to get at the Parliamentary Committee itself and obtain redress. Express letters were sent from the C.L.C., and a deputation again arranged to meet the Parliamentary Committee. This once more necessitated an interview with Mr. Bowerman. Mr. Bowerman, with *his* courteous smile, had no doubt the Committee would prefer meeting us in London after the Congress was over!!! But if we insisted, the Committee would meet on Friday evening and the matter could then be raised. Mr. Bowerman could afford to smile, for not only was he representing Ruskin

College, but the Trade Union Congress as well. For the moment he was strongly entrenched, and so we had to submit. Meanwhile we organized a meeting on Thursday night; Mr. Winstone in the chair, Mr. Barker and Mrs. Bridges Adams speakers. Considering the scratch character of the meeting, it was a well attended gathering. We had a Ruskin student, an aspirant to that honour, and a secretary of a W.E.A. Branch as our critics. The Ruskin student wanted to appear as an unofficial speaker. Winstone not allowing this, he complained that he had no opportunity to put his case. I immediately challenged him to a debate. Did I say challenged! I mean I begged him; became quite eloquent in my appeal; offered to pay for the hall, and print the bills. He stammered a little, and said he could not enter into a debate without the consent of Ruskin College Executive. Finally, he promised the meeting to wire down and give his reply by 11 o'clock next day. Since then Ben McKay and I have been on the look out for him, but he apparently vanished. We had numerous inquiries next day from those who had attended the meeting as to whether our Ruskin friend had turned up, but, like Casabianca, he "was nowhere to be found." We waited on the Parliamentary Committee on Friday night. After a hour in the passage, fearing we were the victims of P.C. humour, we ventured to open the door. The Parliamentary Committee were undergoing a photographic operation. They had not reached our case, and we were requested once again to "wait and see." As some of our number had to leave that night, and as there was no possible hope for a discussion on the Saturday before the remnants of the Congress, we shook the dust from our feet—and went. Thus the Congress. We have now nearly twelve months before us. Let every "Pleb" agitate in his Trade Union; bring the facts before the notice of his fellows; see that a resolution is sent on in time for the next agenda. Let us prepare to organize a demonstration for next Congress week (at Newport, Mon.), and if every "Pleb" puts his shoulder to the wheel, we shall expose the bureaucracy of the Parliamentary Committee, and, at the same time, gain a platform second to none for the advocacy of the principle of Independence in Working-class Education.

NOAH ABLETT.